Does the Economy Determine the President? A Regression Model For Predicting US Presidential Elections by Roth, Roy K
Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 11
2012
Does the Economy Determine the President? A
Regression Model For Predicting US Presidential
Elections
Roy K. Roth
Brigham Young University - Utah, roykroth@gmail.com
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Roth, Roy K. (2011) "Does the Economy Determine the President? A Regression Model For Predicting US Presidential
Elections," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 11.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol8/iss1/11
Does the Economy Determine the President? A Regression Model For
Predicting US Presidential Elections
Abstract
There is a prevalent belief that the economy determines the President. If the economy is good, the President
keeps his job, if it is bad, he is out. A large body of econometric literature has been published on this topic.
This paper takes a new approach. I look not at how the popular vote changes with economic conditions, but
how the electoral vote changes. I further examine how these changes affect the probability that the incumbent
party stays in office. I find that economic conditions may not be as important as they have been purported to
be.
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 1 Introduction 
Many Americans believe that the economy determines who wins the presidency. There is 
a large body of work dedicated to the effects that the economy has on presidential elections in 
the United States. This paper takes a slightly different approach, and presents important insights. 
I find that while economic conditions are important, they are usually overshadowed in elections 
where an incumbent faces a challenger.  
The majority of work done in this area, including Fair (1972) and Kahane (2009), use the 
percentage of the popular vote as the dependent variable of their econometric models. In this 
paper I use two models that supplement the existing literature on this subject. The first estimates 
a vote-share equation with the percentage of the electoral vote, rather than the popular vote, as 
the dependent variable. The second estimates the probability that the Democratic candidate in 
any particular election will win. My approach has two clear benefits. First, these methods give 
clear predictions of the winner. Equations giving a prediction of  the share of the popular vote  
sometimes fail in this area. The results of the 2000 election give an example of why this is 
desirable. Gore, the Democratic candidate received  the majority of the popular vote, but 
received fewer electoral votes than Bush. Gore lost the election by a small margin. In that 
situation even a perfect prediction of the popular vote would be misleading. The second 
advantage regards significant third-party candidates. In 1992 and 1996 elections, Ross Perot 
played a major role as a third party candidate, receiving 18.9% and 8% of the popular vote, 
respectively. This could seriously affect vote-share models based on a two-party system. 
Electoral votes, however, are given (with a few exceptions) only when a candidate receives the 
largest share of the popular vote in a state, and are thus less sensitive to third-party candidates. 
Even Perot failed to receive a single electoral vote. In fact, during the elections covered in this 
paper, no third-party candidates received any electoral votes.   
 In this paper I use a small number of economic indicators, coupled with measures of the 
tenure of the political party in the White House and an indicator of whether or not the incumbent 
president is running for reelection to make predictions of the election winners. I then compare 
the predictions of this model to the actual outcomes to determine if the model is has reliable 
predictive power. This is of particular interest because we do not take into account other political 
factors such as campaign donations, endorsements, political blunders, etc. I do not claim that 
these are unimportant; however, we test the assumption that the state of the economy and the 
pursuit of reelection  are the more important factors. I leave open the possibility that some of 
these factors, possibly including campaign donations and endorsements, are a function of 
economic and incumbency conditions.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of 
some of the significant work already done in this area. Section 3 then presents the model I test in 
this paper. Section 4 describes the data I use to test my hypothesis. Section 5 presents the result 
of my econometric analysis. Section 6 presents my conclusions as well as suggestions for further 
research.  
 
2 Background 
 The most well-known econometric work in elections is by Ray Fair. In his 1978 paper he 
begins with a basis of utility theory and builds a model in which a voter considers current 
economic conditions and his or her expected utility under each of the candidates; the voter then 
votes for the candidate under which he or she has higher expected utility. Fair then uses national 
data on economic indicators, most notably the growth rate of GNP and inflation as measured by 
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 the growth rate of the GNP deflator to test the validity of his model. His predictions are quite 
accurate.  
 Kahane takes a similar approach using panel data at the state level. This presents several 
advantages over data at the national level, as well as several drawbacks. The first advantage  is 
that the sample size necessarily increases. There are 50 states from which to gather data in each 
presidential election, as opposed to one nation. Thus there are 50 observations for each election 
year rather than one. Another advantage is that with more observations, there is more possibility 
for variation in the explanatory variables, increasing the reliability of estimators. There are also 
important drawbacks. For many of the desired explanatory variables, data is only available at the 
national level, therefore proxies are needed at the state level. While proxies can be very useful, 
there is always some loss of accuracy when they are used. Kahane finds that economic 
conditions are significant in determining the election outcomes (2009). 
 
3 Model  
 I hypothesize that the economic conditions immediately preceding a presidential election 
have a strong predictive effect on the outcome. There are at least two ways that these conditions 
could affect voting behavior. The most immediate plausible assumption is that voters consider 
how their own economic health has been affected during the tenure of the current presidential 
incumbent, then vote for the incumbent candidate or party if the change is favorable, and vote 
against the incumbent otherwise. However, there are other possible explanations. Another 
possibility is that voters exhibit sociotropic voting patterns. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) explain 
“Purely sociotropic citizens vote according to the country's pocketbook, not their own. Citizens 
moved by sociotropic information support candidates that appear to have furthered the nation's 
economic well-being and oppose candidates and parties that seem to threaten it.” There may 
indeed be more avenues through which economic conditions affect voters’ behavior. We do not 
hypothesize nor do we test how the effect enters into the voters’ minds. We simply analyze the 
observable effects. 
 I test the hypothesis that an important economic indicator in presidential elections is the 
growth rate of real production. Production growth could affect voters in at least two ways. The 
most clear way is through their own wealth. Though increased production will not affect 
everyone equally, it is a good indicator of the aggregate economic well-being of US voters. The 
other way that it could enter into voting decisions is through the media. Voters, especially voters 
who are up to date on the news, hear media reports of the health of the economy. A common 
indicator reported is the growth of production. This second way could be particularly important 
if the idea of sociotropic voting behavior is believed. In that case, even when an individual voters 
are in desirable economic circumstances, reports of low production growth could lead those 
voters to vote for the non-incumbent candidate or party.  
 Inflation and unemployment are also important economic indicators, and are plausibly 
important in determining election outcomes. Americans cringe when inflation is higher than 
what is considered good and healthy. We would therefore expect that the incumbent party would 
be less likely to win an election when inflation has been high. However, deflation is just as bad 
and as dangerous to an economy as inflation. The absolute value of the inflation rate thus seems 
the most appropriate variable to use in this context. The unemployment rate may be the most 
reported economic indicator. It is also plausible that it has the largest effect on individual voters 
well-being (at least for those who are unemployed), and on the decisions of sociotropic voters. 
However, the Current Population Survey, the survey from which the unemployment rate is 
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 determined, did not begin until 1940. Using this data would limit our already small sample size. 
We will therefore not include unemployment in our analysis, but will leave that work until more 
data becomes available.  
 There are of course other factors that must be taken into account. It is reasonable to 
believe that there is a fundamental difference in elections where an incumbent is running for 
reelection against a challenger, and elections where two non-incumbents are running. It is also 
logical that if one particular party has been in control for a long time that there is a different 
election atmosphere. 
A key assumption of my models is that the contest between Republicans and Democrats 
is a zero-sum game. In other words if the economy is strong, and a Democrat is in office, then 
the Democrat in the next election should have an advantage. The same is true if there is a 
Republican in office. To account for this contest, values of the explanatory variables will 
multiplied by I, a dummy variable equal to 1 when a Democrat is in office and -1 when a 
Republican is in office.  Taking these factors into account, I believe that an equation for vote-
share can be written as 
 𝑃𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼 ∗ 𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (1) 
 where Prcteli is the percentage of electoral votes received by the Democratic candidate. The 
other variables have their intuitive interpretations, and are  more fully specified in the data 
section. Similarly, a probability model can be specified as 
 𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼 ∗ 𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖+ 𝑢𝑖 (2) 
We will test these models for their statistical significance as well as for the accuracy of their 
predictions. 
 
4 Data  
 I use data for the elections from 1932 to 2008, inclusive, for a sample size of 20 
observations. My analysis closely follows the work of Fair (2009), however, there are important 
changes. The first is the change of dependent variable. The benefits of this change have already 
been discussed. There is at least one significant drawback. It is that electoral votes are not a 
measure of the percentage of votes cast by individual voters, but instead votes cast on behalf of 
states. Electoral votes are assigned to states based on population. The results of any analysis 
therefore cannot be interpreted as the effect of economic conditions on individuals voting 
behavior. They can only be interpreted as the effects that those same conditions have on electoral 
votes received, an important distinction. As the 2000 election demonstrates, those are not always 
the same thing. Likewise, the probability equation says nothing about margin of victory, or votes 
received. Notwithstanding this weakness, electoral votes and probabilities are useful measures in 
this study, and will add a new approach to the extant literature on this subject. 
 There are several ways to measure the growth rate of production. Fair, in his original 
1978 paper, uses the average growth rate of real GNP over the two year period immediately 
preceding the election. Kahane, using state level data, is uses a slightly different measure—
change in per capita income. We use the growth rate of real per capita GDP. We use GDP 
because it is the primary and official estimate of United States production. It is also the measure 
most commonly reported, and is easily accessible on the BEA website. The time period is the 
first three quarters of the election year. This is the same measure used in Fair’s 2009 paper. This 
approach provides several advantages. First, using data for the first three quarters of the election 
year, measured at an annual rate, provided more satisfactory results in my regressions than any 
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 other time period. It also seems reasonable that voters base their decisions on more recent 
economic developments. Per capita GDP is used rather than aggregate GDP because there was a 
very large change in the population of the United States over the time specified. Per capita GDP 
therefore seemed a more appropriate measure.  
 Inflation is also measured the same as in Fair (2009). The measure is the absolute value 
of the growth rate of the GDP deflator in the first fifteen quarters of the incumbent 
administration, except in 1944 and 1948, where the values are zero. This was chosen for two 
reasons. The first is that by using the same data as Fair, we are able to see if his results hold 
when vote-share equations are specified differently. The second is that the time period is 
appropriate. The time period allows a sufficient period for changes in the price level to affect 
voters. The GDP deflator was chosen rather than a measure of CPI to be consistent with Fair 
(2009). 
 Political measures are straightforward. The variable Reelect is equal to 1 if the incumbent 
president is a Democrat and is running for reelection, -1 if the incumbent president is Republican 
and running for reelection, and zero otherwise. The variable Terms is similarly defined. It is 
equal to the number of consecutive terms that the president has been of the same party as the 
incumbent. It likewise takes on a positive value if the president is a Democrat and a negative 
value if the president is a Republican. Full explanations of the variables, as well as summary 
statistics are listed in the appendix as Table 1. 
 
5 Results 
 I first estimate equation (1), the vote-share equation. A full listing of the estimates is 
listed in the appendix as Table 2. The first and second equations in Table 2 were estimated by 
OLS. To account for possible heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are reported. In equation 
(1) the model is estimated using all of the variables listed. The resulting equation predicts 16 out 
of the 20 elections correctly. Equation (2) omits the inflation rate and estimates the vote-share 
model using only the other 3 explanatory variables. The result is slightly more accurate, 
predicting 17 elections correctly.  
 The estimated coefficient on I*Inflation is 1.353 in (1), though it was not statistically 
different than zero at any reasonable significance level. Despite this, the positive coefficient 
seems counterintuitive. It also contradicts the results of Fair (2009) and Kahane (2009). We 
therefore re-estimated equation (1) using LAD rather than OLS to account for any possible 
influential observations. The sample size of 20 is rather small for LAD estimation, but the 
predictions of this model are reliable—17 out of 20 predictions were correct—enough to provide 
some validity to the estimation. The coefficient estimate for inflation in this equation is  -1.821; 
but it is likewise not statistically different than zero. It does, however, seem more intuitive, and is 
more in line with the published literature on the subject. We therefore cannot say anything 
conclusive about the marginal effect of a change in the inflation rate on Prctel. The same is not 
true for I*gProduction, which was highly statistically significant in all three regressions. The 
estimated marginal effect is also intuitive, and in line with previous work on the subject (see Fair 
1978; Fair 2009; Kahane 2009).  
 A surprising result in all three regressions is the size of the marginal effect of the variable 
Reelect, which had a marginal effect of greater than 25% of the electoral vote in each estimated 
equation. However, that coefficient alone can be misleading. Due to the way in which Terms is 
specified, whenever a president is running for reelection, the value of Terms will be at least one 
in absolute value (when there are Republican incumbents the value will be negative). Because 
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 the coefficient estimate for Terms is negative, the net effect of running for reelection will be 
smaller than coefficient estimate for Reelect alone would suggest. Nevertheless, the effect is 
large enough, together with the constant, to overshadow almost any other conditions and predict 
an incumbent victory. This seems somewhat extreme; however, it is historically accurate. In the 
elections covered in this paper there were 13 elections where an incumbent was running for 
reelection. Only three lost. 
 Estimation of the probability equation (equation  (2)) led to similar results to those of the 
vote-share equation, but with slightly more accurate predictions. Table 3 contains a full listing of 
the estimates. The results were interpreted as a prediction of a Democrat win whenever  ?̂? > .5 
and a Republican win otherwise. Three of the four estimated equations ((1), (3), and (4)) made 
predictions with 90% accuracy. Equation (1) was simply estimated by OLS using robust standard 
errors. Due to the inherent heteroskedasticity associated with the linear probability model, 
equation (1) was re-estimated by WLS (weights = 1
𝑝�(1−𝑝�) ). However, there were 3 predicted 
probabilities greater than one, and one predicted as negative. The estimated probability less than 
zero was replaced with .001 and those greater than one were replaced with .999 to make possible 
WLS (specific values of .999 and .001 were chosen by the author). The estimate of this equation 
is listed in Table 3 as equation (2).  
 The OLS and WLS estimates made several predictions out of the [0,1] range. For this 
reason, and for robustness, the probability model was also estimated by probit and logit 
regressions. These estimates are listed in Table 3 as equations (3) and (4). The coefficient 
estimates listed are evaluated at the mean for each respective explanatory variable, with the 
exception of the constant term, where such a report would be meaningless. These equations, 
together with the OLS estimate of the LPM, were the most historically accurate, predicting 18 of 
the 20 elections correctly.  
Importantly, the same effect found in the vote-share predictions were also found here. 
The marginal effect of running for reelection is again large enough to overshadow almost any 
other conditions. Though, once again, the effect is somewhat counteracted by the opposite effect 
of the variable Terms. These results are not found by Fair (2009) or Kahane (2009), though they 
do estimate a positive marginal effect of running for reelection. My findings simply estimate that 
effect to be much larger.  
 A full listing of each model’s predicted winner for each election is listed as Table 4 in the 
appendix. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 My results are mixed. The economic variable most consistently significant in our 
regressions was the growth rate of real production, which was statistically significant in each of 
our electoral vote-share equations. However, it was not significant in any of the probability 
equations. But, the estimated effect in each equation was positive, lending credibility to the 
theory that economic growth matters in elections. Inflation, on the other hand was not 
statistically significant in any of our estimated equations. Furthermore the sign of its estimated 
coefficient was not consistent across our estimations. This seems to indicate that inflation is not a 
key economic variable to consider. Perhaps there are other variables that would be more 
significant.  
The strength of the models is shown in the accurate predictions that are made. The 
probability models were the most reliable, predicting 90% of elections in the time frame 
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 correctly. When more data becomes available, re-estimation of these models should yield more 
statistically significant results.  
 The models presented in this paper are designed to be a supplement to the already 
published literature on the subject. However, this is by no means the end of the topic. There is 
still more work to be done in the field of understanding and predicting presidential elections in 
the United States. An immediate extension is to use other measures of economic growth (such as 
stock averages) and inflation (CPI) and see if the results are consistent with those presented in 
this paper. Measures of unemployment may also shed light on this issue and result in more 
accurate predictions, especially as time passes and more data becomes available.  
 The most significant contribution of this paper is that perhaps economic indicators are not 
as significant as they have been portrayed. They seem to have very significant effects on the 
share of the popular vote (see Fair 2009), however, this research indicates that their effects are 
less significant in actually determining the winner of an election. The advantage that an 
incumbent has over a challenger is usually large enough to overshadow economic conditions. As 
a result this research provides some justification of term-limits. Further research in this area 
should reinforce these findings.  
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Variable Description Mean
Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
Demwins
Equal to one if the Democratic 
candidate wins the election and zero 
otherwise.
.6 .503 0 1
Prctel
The percentage of electoral votes 
received by the Democratic 
candidate.
54.930 30.799 2.246 98.493
gProduction
The growth rate of per capita GDP 
in the first three quarters of the 
election year. measured at an annual 
rate
2.028 5.136 -14.586 11.836
Inflation
The absolute value of the average 
rate of inflation over the first 15 
quarters of the current presidential 
term, except for 1944 and 1948 
when the value is zero.
3.054 2.370 0 7.864
Reelect
Equal to 1 if the current president is 
a Democrat and is running for 
reelection. Equal to -1 if the current 
president is a Republican and 
running for reelection. Zero 
Otherwise.
.05 .826 -1 1
Terms
Equal to 1 (-1) if the Democratic 
(Republican) party has been in the 
White House for one term. 2 (-2) If 
two terms, and so on.
.25 2.268 -3 5
I
Equal to 1 if the current president is 
a Democrat and -1 if the current 
president is a Republican.
0 1.026 -1 1
Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics
Years 1928 through 2008 (n=20)
Appendix
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(1) (2) (3)
Estimation Method OLS OLS LAD
2.858*** 2.759*** 3.459**
(.773) (.783) (1.432)
1.353
(1.667)
25.828*** 28.488*** 34.331***
(7.316) (6.588) (11.251)
-7.828*** -6.842*** -5.134
(2.294) (1.904) (3.587)
52.323 50.857 44.200
(5.854) (4.977) (7.805)
n 20 20 20
Standard Error 18.638 18.427 -
R
2 .711 .699 .515
F-Statistic 22.22 27.56 -
Percent Predicted 
Correctly
80% 85% 85%
Table 2:
Estimation of Prctel
• The R
2
 in (3) is the Psuedo R
2 
from the LAD regression
I*gProduction
I*Inflation
Reelect
Terms
Constant
-
•Percent predicted correctly based on if the model predicted the 
correct winner
•Robust standard errors in parentheses
•* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5%level, and *** denotes significance at the 
1% level
-1.821
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS WLS Probit Logit
.0228 .0044 .0531 .0527
(.0135) (.0047) (.0447) (.0498)
-.0352 -.0368 -.0288 -.0292
(.0279) (.0219) (.0589) (0602)
.5975*** .6075*** .8929*** .9131**
(.1116) (.0635) (.3632) (.4221)
-.1181** -.0883*** -.2196* -.2317
(.0500) (.0198) (.1387) (.1505)
.5294 .5233 .1277 .2993
(.1058) (.0198) (.4542) (.8462)
n 20 20 20 20
Standard Error .3363 .0620 - -
R
2 .6459 .9807 .6128 .6074
F-Statistic/Chi-Square 
Statistic
17.55 242.50 16.50 16.35
Log Liklihood - - -5.212 -5.285
Percent Predicted 
Correctly
90% 85% 90% 90%
Terms
Table 3:
Estimation of P(Demwins)
I*gProduction
I*Inflation
Reelect
•Coefficients reported in (3) and (4) are the marginal effects computed at the 
mean, except for the constant term
Constant
•Robust standard errors in parentheses in (1)
•Percent predicted correctly based on if the model predicted the correct winner
•* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5%level, 
and *** denotes significance at the 1% level
• The R
2
 in (3) and (4) is the Psuedo R
2
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Year Winner (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1932 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1936 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1940 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1944 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1948 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1952 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1956 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1960 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1964 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1968 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1976 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1980 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1992 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2008 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number Predicted 
Correctly
- 16 17 17 18 17 18 18
Percent Predicted 
Correctly
- 80% 85% 85% 90% 85% 90% 90%
Vote Share Equations Probability Equations
Predicted Winners
Table 4:
•1 represents a Democrat, 0 represents a Republican
10
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2012 Election Predictions 
 There is still almost a year until the 2012 election. Currently, it is not even clear who the 
Republican nominee for the presidency will be, however, I can use the most up to date data 
available to make a prediction of which party will win. Using data from Fair’s website1 my 
prediction is the same for all models. I predict a victory for President Obama. However, there is 
much that can happen between now and election day.  
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